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TAKING THE RISK OUT OF TERMINATION: AN ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT
ANALYSIS OF THE NORMATIVE SYSTEM OF EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS
CHALLENGED BY HONDA v KEAYS
Ryan Henry Edmonds*

“Work is one of the most fundamental aspects in a person's life, providing the individual
with a means of financial support and…a contributory role in society. A person's
employment is an essential component of his or her sense of identity, self-worth and
emotional well-being.”1
- Chief Justice Dickson, 1987

INTRODUCTION
Over many years, Canadian courts have crafted a unique body of employment law
jurisprudence. The purpose of this paper is to discuss how that jurisprudence was
unraveled when the Supreme Court of Canada rendered its decision in Honda v. Keays.2
That holding, in effect, overturned aspects of Wallace v. United Grain Growers;3 a case
that transformed how non-unionized employees were thought of and treated in Canadian
society. This paper examines the analytical underpinnings of wrongful dismissal law’s
previous regime on bad faith damages and juxtaposes it to the new regime in Keays,
concluding that the shift in focus from employer misconduct to employee losses
exacerbates the employment relationship’s power imbalance and deprives employees of
protection when they need it the most. In reaching this conclusion, the paper uses the
analytic frameworks of reflexive regulation and enterprise risk management to predict
how employers will react to their newfound advantage. The finding is that by taking the
risk out of termination, there is now downward pressure to do away with the normative
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“upwardly ratcheting” system of employment standards that workplaces enjoyed under
Wallace.
EXPLAINING CORPORATE BEHAVIOUR: RISK AND REGULATION
i.

Theories of Regulation: Centralized and Reflexive Regulation

Academic literature posits two kinds of regulatory force: “centralized” (or “command
and control”) regulation and “decentered” (or “reflexive”) regulation. In either case, the
state’s purpose is to exert influence over how the target entity comports itself. Whether
it is centralized or reflexive regulation, this is done by creating a situation where risk
management, with respect to that influence, is prioritized vis-à-vis other competing
objectives.4
With centralized regulation, the state’s intention is to strictly hold the target to a set of
rules. If not followed, then the rules are enforced by subjecting the target to sanctions.5
Thus, the decision-making process with respect to centralized regulation is for the target
to prioritize rule compliance for fear of punishment. Consider employment standards
legislation,6 which sets out terms of the employment relationship that employers must
observe. Typically this includes limiting working hours,7 setting a minimum wage,8
statutorily protecting leaves of absence,9 and requiring that appropriate notice of
termination be given.10 Centralized regulation posits that an employer will comply with
employment standards because the risk of sanctions is greater than any profit that could
be derived from non-compliance.11
Reflexive regulation, which is the focus of this paper, operates quite differently. With
the centralized approach, there are limits in terms of jurisdiction and substance as to
what may be regulated.12 The state may have a preference for certain conduct, but for
one reason or another, it may be inappropriate or impossible to enforce this preference
with a sanction. In such cases, scholars argue that reflexive regulation holds the
answer.13 Rather than compelling conduct with sanctions, reflexive regulation operates
4
Bridget M. Hutter and Clive J. Jones, “From Government to Governance: External Influences on
Business Risk Management” (2007) Regulation & Governance 27.
5
Ibid.
6
See e.g. Employment Standards Act, 2000, SO 2000, c 41.
7
Ibid, s 17.
8
Ibid, s 23.
9
Ibid, ss 46-53.
10
Ibid, ss 54-66.
11
Ibid, s 133-139. Also, certain remedies prescribed for certain standards have a normative
element as well. See s 53, which permits reinstatement for breaches of statutory leaves. For an
empirical analysis of the questionable effectiveness of reinstatement as a remedy for employment
disputes in Quebec, see Gilles Trudeau, “Is Reinstatement a Remedy Suitable to At-Will
Employees?” (1991) 30 Indus Rel 302.
12
David J. Doorey, “Who Made That?: Influencing Foreign Labour Practices through Reflexive
Domestic Disclosure Regulation” (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall LJ 353 at 366 [Doorey, “Who Made
That?”].
13
Ibid.
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by influencing the target’s normative practices by shaping the context in which
interaction occurs.14 A classic example is the American Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act,15 which requires lending institutions to disclose a racial breakdown of loan
recipients in order to discourage racially preferential lending practices.16 The logic is
that by making a breakdown of loan recipients public record, this information could be
used to antagonize malfeasant lenders. By creating a risk of public shaming, the intent is
to influence lending practices by making the target prioritize compliance vis-à-vis any
profit it could derive from the discouraged course of action. In other words, reflexive
regulation posits that by injecting risk into the decision making process, a corporation’s
behaviour will be steered towards the preferred course of conduct.17
Reflexive regulation’s application to labour law is not new, however discussion of it has
previously been confined to issues of transnational labour regulation. David Doorey has
argued that if disclosure of apparel manufacturers’ factory locations were required,
employers would improve labour standards for fear of the risks created by NGO groups
exposing “sweatshop” conditions.18 In an alternative vein, Sabel, O’Rourke and Fung
propose a “ratcheting” theory of transnational labour standards.19 This theory is
premised on requiring corporations to disclose information on labour standards to
transnational monitoring groups, who in turn rank the firms according to certain indicia.
The idea is that high profile companies would compete to build their reputation as
socially responsible actors, and the competition would result in a transnational “upward
ratcheting” of voluntarily adopted labour standards. In what follows, this paper proposes
that Canadian workplaces previously enjoyed a hybrid form of normative “ratcheting”
labour standards via the risks associated with the ubiquitous threat of Wallace damages.
However, since Keays has taken much of the risk out of termination, it is argued that this
system of reflexive regulation is no longer in effect.
ii.

Theories of Risk: Enterprise Risk Management

For reflexive regulation to have any normative force, the target must perceive (and
prioritize) risk in the situation it is faced with.20 Consequently, this paper will interpret
14

Ibid.
12 USC 2800.
16
Doorey, “Who Made That?” at 373.
17
David J. Doorey, “Can Factory List Disclosure Improve Labor Practices in the Apparel
Industry? A Case Study of Nike and Levi-Strauss” (2008) [unpublished], online: CLPE Research
Paper Series 1 http://www.comparativeresearch.net/index.jsp at 8 [Doorey, “Factory List
Disclosure”].
18
See generally, David J. Doorey, “In Defence of Transnational Domestic Labor Regulation”
(2010) Vanderbilt J of Trans L 953; Doorey, “Who Made That?”; Doorey, “Factory List
Disclosure”.
19
Charles Sabel, Dara O’Rourke and Archon Fung, “Ratcheting Labor Standards: Regulations for
Continuous Improvement in the Global Workplace” (2000) KSG Working Paper Number 00-010,
Columbia Center for Law and Economic Studies.
20
Ryan Henry Edmonds, “Reflexively Regulating International Labour Practices: Are We There
Yet? An Enterprise Risk Management Analysis of Social Disclosure” (2010) [unpublished,
submitted in fulfillment of ‘International and Comparative Labour Law’ (3040.3N) at Osgoode
Hall Law School] online: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1737931.
15
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the risk component of reflexive regulation in accordance with the principles of
Enterprise Risk Management (“ERM”).
The individual components of ERM have long been functions of sound business
management, but ERM as a cohesive discipline and function of senior management
emerged only recently.21 In response to public pressure from the collapse of Barings
Bank and other financial disasters of the 1990s, public-private consortium groups
published a number of guidelines on best accounting practices for internal financial risk
controls.22 Notably, however, these guidelines also urged companies to go beyond
financial risk and to begin accounting for risks posed by law, health and safety, the
environment, reputational damage, and so on.23 As a result, ERM as an independent,
cohesive discipline emerged from the amalgamation of financial risk, operational risk,
and strategic risk. Although ERM is prescribed for banks and other financial
institutions,24 policy makers have strongly recommended that all businesses adopt it as a
matter of good corporate governance,25 making it a useful framework for present
purposes.
In order to appreciate an employer’s response to the new requirements for Keays
damages, it must be emphasized that ERM is not merely a discipline aimed at risk
mitigation. Rather, ERM’s service to a company lies in its value-creation function
because ERM is uniquely positioned to exploit risk-generating events in a way that
advances the company’s interests.26 For example, consider risk hedging; once an ERM
practitioner identifies a risk to the company, he or she will undertake another risky
activity in order to offset that risk. Insurers who hedge mortality risks by selling both
life insurance and business annuity insurance to the same customer group are the classic
example of this.27 As businesses exist to derive profit for their shareholders, ERM’s
propensity for value-creation makes it a useful framework to examine and predict
employers’ responses to Keays.
The three disciplines within ERM are financial risk, operational risk, and strategic risk.
Each is an independent discipline in its own right, but they are joined together under the
21

See eg, Casualty Actuarial Society, “Overview of Enterprise Risk Management”, online:
http://www.casact.org/research/erm/overview.pdf at 3 [ERM, “Overview”]. See also Lisa K.
Meulbroek, “Integrated Risk Management for the Firm: A Senior Manager’s Guide” (2002)
[unpublished] online: http://www.hbs.edu/research/facpubs/workingpapers/papers2/0102/02046.pdf and Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, “Enterprise
Risk Management – Integrated Framework”, online:
http://www.coso.org/Publications/ERM/COSO_ERM_ExecutiveSummary.pdf.
22
See eg, the Turnbull Report in the United Kingdom, online:
http://portal.surrey.ac.uk/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/RISK/BACKGROUND/LEGISLATION/TURNB
ULL/TURNBULL%20REPORT.PDF, and the Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent
Financial Reporting in North America (the “Treadway Commission”), online:
http://www.coso.org.
23
ERM, “Overview” at 3.
24
Basel II is legislated through the Office of the Supervisor of Financial Institutions, online:
http://www.infosource.gc.ca/inst/sif/fed04-eng.asp.
25
ERM, “Overview” at 35.
26
Ibid at 8.
27
Ibid at 4.

Vol 20

Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies

39

value-creating principle of ERM. Financial risk is the most traditional form of risk
analysis. It is typically concerned with a company’s share price, its cost of undertaking
business ventures, its purchasing power, and its ability to hedge risk. Operational risk is
an inter-disciplinary method of risk assessment that is embedded into functions such as
human resources, product development, supply chain management, and information
reporting.28 It works by harnessing the diverse skills of internal agents in order to
identify risks within their functional expertise. Following this risk assessment, senior
management then operationalizes internal controls based on the agents’
recommendations.29 Finally, strategic risk is primarily concerned with reputation
management and competitive pressures.30 The former speaks to the value that offers
“premium product prices, lower costs for capital and labour, [and] improved loyalty
from employees”,31 while the latter considers the business’ standing vis-à-vis the public
and its competitors.32
In what follows, an ERM analysis of the financial, operational, and strategic risks
associated with bad faith discharges will show that the recent Keays reformulation has
reduced the risk of employee terminations. While this may seem reasonable on its face,
a deeper analysis of the Wallace regime and the effect its precedents had on motivating
employer best practices will show that the Supreme Court took a serious misstep when
rendering its decision in Keays.
WHAT WAS ONCE OLD… REVIEW OF DAMAGES IN CANADIAN EMPLOYMENT LAW
The law of non-unionized employment in Canada is fundamentally rooted in the law of
contract. While scholars dispute the exact influence or control that traditional contract
law doctrines have, or should have, over employment law,33 it is clear that courts have
attached special significance to the contract of employment as compared to other
commercial contracts.34 This flows from the judicial recognition that non-unionized
employees are a vulnerable group in society in light of their dependence on employers to
continually purchase their labour power without any mechanism for future job security.35
Consequently, courts have held that traditional contract law doctrines must be re-thought

28
Ibid at 10. Michael Power, “The Invention of Operational Risk” (2005) Review of International
Political Economy 577 at 584 [Power, “Operational Risk”].
29
Power, supra note 28 at 585.
30
ERM, “Overview” at 10.
31
Jan Bebbington, Carlos Larrinaga & Jose M. Moneva, “Corporate Social Reporting and
Reputation Risk Management” (2007) Corporate Social Reporting 337 at 339 [Bebbington,
“Reputation Risk Management”].
32
Ibid at 346.
33
See Don Jack and Jane Southren, “The Problem with Wrongful Dismissal Law” 5 CLELJ 45 at
47 [Jack, “Problem with Wrongful Dismissal”], and John Swan, “Damages for Wrongful
Dismissal: Lessons from Wallace v. United Grain Growers” 6 CLELJ 313 [Swan, “Lessons from
Wallace”].
34
See Slaight Communications Inc v Davidson, [1989] 1 SCR 1038 at 1051-52.
35
See Wallace at paras 72-73.
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in order to account for this inherent unfairness in non-unionized employment.36 While
this has caused much frustration for commercial litigators,37 scholars have generally
applauded courts’ progressive thinking.38 However, none of this has changed the fact
that an employment relationship can still be terminated for any reason,39 provided
adequate notice is given. In this regard, the judiciary’s most significant innovation has
been the remedy crafted to protect employees from acts of bad faith when they are at
their most vulnerable; namely at the time of termination.
i.

The Early Years: Hadley and Addis/Peso’s Strict Limits on Wrongful
Dismissal Recovery

Canadian courts did not arrive at this progressive position overnight. At first, contracts
of employment were considered no different than any other commercial contract. This
meant that wrongful dismissal actions were subject to the cap on foreseeability imposed
by Hadley v Baxendale,40 which limited recovery to only that which was in the
contemplation of the parties at the time of contract formation. Under the 19th century
Hadley regime, the only damages plaintiffs could recover were compensation for pay in
lieu of reasonable notice.41 This was premised on the artificial notion courts imputed
that it was always in the contemplation of the parties that the contract may end at any
time, provided adequate notice was given.42 Consequently, under the Hadley regime, the
loss of employment and everything associated with it was not per se compensable;
rather, only damages representing the proper length of notice that ought to have been
given could be recovered.43 For many years to come, this doctrine had the effect of
significantly restricting the scope of what was recoverable in a wrongful dismissal
action.
In Addis v Gramophone Co.,44 a case nearly a hundred years ahead of its time, the House
of Lords considered whether an employee could recover losses in a wrongful dismissal
action for harm occasioned by the manner of termination. Relying on the analytical
rubric of Hadley, the Law Lords rejected the claim. Lord Loreburn noted that the
employer could not be liable for “the injured feelings of the servant, or for the loss he
36
Such progressive thinking has led courts to adopt different rules about: employment contract
formation, see Adams v Comark Inc (1992), 81 Man R (2d) 119 (CA) regarding imputing terms of
employment by conduct over time; interpretation, see Ceccol v Ontario Gymnastic Federation
(2001), 55 OR (3d) 614 (CA) regarding the interpretation of employment contracts commensurate
with the protection of employees; and modification, see Hobbs v TDI Canada Ltd (2004), 246
DLR (4th) 43 (Ont CA), regarding the insufficiency of continued employment as valid
consideration to sustain change to an employment contract.
37
Jack, “Problem with Wrongful Dismissal” at 50-63.
38
Geoffrey England, “Recent Developments in Individual Employment Law: Tell Me the Old, Old
Story” 9 CLELJ 44 [England, “Tell Me the Old Story”].
39
Provided the reason does not run afoul of prohibited grounds set out by employment standards,
labour relations, or human rights legislation.
40
(1854) 9 Ex 341, 156 ER 145, 23 LJ Ex 179.
41
Jack, “Problem with Wrongful Dismissal” at 48.
42
Ibid. See also Morrison v Abernathy School Board (1876), 3 SC (4th) 945 (HL).
43
Jack, “Problem with Wrongful Dismissal” at 48.
44
[1909] AC 488.
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may sustain from the fact that his having been dismissed of itself makes it more difficult
for him to obtain fresh employment.”45 In his concurring reasons, Lord Atkinson noted
that a tort claim for malice, fraud, or defamation was the proper domain for such
recovery, and that it had no place in an action for breach of contract.46 Addis remained
the law in Canada for some time, and its holding was echoed nearly verbatim by the
Supreme Court in 1966’s Peso Silver Mines Ltd v Cropper,47 when it ruled that
“damages [in a wrongful dismissal action] cannot be increased by reason of the
circumstances of dismissal whether in respect of the respondent’s wounded feelings or
the prejudicial effect upon his reputation and chances of finding other employment
[emphasis added].”48 Addis and Peso governed the law of recovery in wrongful
dismissal actions until the Supreme Court undertook its modernization of non-unionized
employment law, beginning in 1989 with Vorvis v Insurance Corp of British Columbia.49
ii.

A Precursor of Things to Come: Vorvis and Machtinger’s New Direction

Vorvis concerned the termination of an in-house lawyer, Eonis J. Vorvis, who was
described as “conscientious to a fault” and produced “Cadillac[s] when Ford[s] would
suffice”.50 He was subject to belittling and humiliating workload meetings each week
that eventually necessitated medical attention, and later precipitated his termination.
Although the Supreme Court rejected his appeal for aggravated and punitive damages,
the majority broke new ground by holding that damages for mental distress occasioned
by the manner of termination could be awarded in a wrongful dismissal action if the
conduct complained of was an independently actionable wrong (e.g. a tort or separate
breach of contract). This was a huge step forward from Addis, which required
discharged plaintiffs to decide whether to frame their action in tort or contract. In
dissent, Wilson J. urged the Court to collapse recovery for mental distress into the rubric
of Hadley, noting that the second branch of the Hadley test permitted extended damages
if there were special circumstances or particular plaintiff vulnerabilities that the
defendant was aware of at the time of contract formation.51 This, she reasoned, was
more appropriate than requiring another independently actionable wrong.
For a case that broke new ground for the rights of terminated employees, it is important
to note that the tone of Vorvis is remarkably sterile. In particular, the only reference to
employee vulnerability was made in passing by Wilson J.’s dissent. Three years later,
however, the Supreme Court unveiled its new policy with respect to non-unionized
employees in Machtinger v. HOJ Industries.52 In that case, Iacobucci J. opened the
Court’s ruling by acknowledging that “the law governing the termination of employment
significantly affects the economic and psychological welfare of employees.” He went on
to describe employment as being of “central importance to our society”, “fundamental to
an individual’s identity” and that non-unionized employees are “in an unequal
45

Ibid at 491.
Ibid at 496.
47
[1966] 1 SCR 673.
48
Ibid.
49
[1989] 1 SCR 1085.
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid at 1123.
52
[1992] 1 SCR 986.
46
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bargaining position” and their interests must be “protected” by remedially interpreting
minimum standards legislation whenever possible.53 As a sign of things to come,
Iacobucci J. also noted that “the manner in which employment can be terminated is
equally important” to other policy considerations. These values set the stage for Wallace
v. United Grain Growers, the Supreme Court’s employment law opus that transformed
the way termination of employment was thought of, managed, and litigated in Canada.
iii.

The Wallace Era: Wrongful Dismissal’s “Market Correction”

If the Supreme Court embarked on a course correction in 1989 with Vorvis and made a
pit stop in 1992 with Machtinger, then it truly arrived in 1997 with Wallace v United
Grain Growers.
Jack Wallace was a sales person who was induced away from lengthy and secure
employment to join the defendant at the age of 45. Despite being the top sales person in
the company and being told he was doing a great job and could work until retirement,
Wallace was inexplicably fired without notice at the age of 59. The employer
maintained egregious just cause allegations that damaged Wallace’s reputation in the
industry until just before trial when they were withdrawn. A lawyer whose academic
publications had vigorously argued the need for a judicial remedy to address bad faith
terminations represented Wallace at the Supreme Court.54 In his own words, Wallace’s
lawyer thought “Canada’s existing law reflected the antiquated values of the United
Kingdom, and that it was wrong to impose these values on Canadian employees”.55 In
light of the direction Vorvis and Machtinger had gone in, he thought the time had finally
come for Canadian wrongful dismissal law to receive a significant and comprehensive
“market correction”.
Wallace presented three arguments to the Supreme Court: first, that because of its special
significance, the contract of employment was a “peace of mind” contract, the breach of
which could give rise to aggravated damages; second, that the Court ought to recognize a
freestanding tort of bad faith discharge; and third, in the alternative to tort, that the law
should impose a contractual term of good faith and fair dealing, the breach of which
could give rise to additional damages. The Court rejected all three of Wallace’s
proposals.56 However, instead of leaving him without recourse, it crafted a truly unique
remedy that became known as “Wallace damages”. Rather than create a tort or impose a
contractual term up front, which could significantly interfere with an employer’s right to
manage its workforce, the Court imposed, though the back door, a sui generis standard
of good faith and fair dealing at the time of termination. This preserved employers’
management rights during the life of the employment relationship, while still giving
employees protection from acts of bad faith at the time of termination, which is when
they are most vulnerable. Notably, the Court’s remedy did not take the form of lump
53

Ibid.
See eg, Stacey Reginald Ball, “Bad Faith Discharge” (1994) 39 McGill LJ 568 [Ball, “Bad Faith
Discharge”].
55
Author’s notes of Stacey Reginald Ball’s lecture to ‘Individual Employment Law’ (2550.03) at
Osgoode Hall Law School, dated March 16, 2010.
56
Wallace at para 88.
54
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sum damages, but rather was fashioned in the form of an extension to the reasonable
notice period.
Similar to Machtinger, the Court’s starting premise was that the relationship between an
employer and non-unionized employee is not one of equal power; a condition assumed
in most other contractual relationships.57 This allowed the Court to declare that the
contract of employment was distinct from other commercial contracts, thus giving it a
special status in Canadian law.58 This flowed from the recognition that a power
imbalance permeates all aspects of an employment contract, and that “compliance” with
its terms is like an act of “submission”.59 Further, the Court noted that work is one of the
most fundamental aspects of a person’s life, which provides not only a livelihood, but
also a sense of identity and self-worth. As such, the Court concluded that the loss of
employment has a profound effect on a person’s emotional well being, and if that loss
was occasioned by acts of bad faith, then the effect will be even greater.60 As a result,
Wallace damages were fashioned in the form of a lengthened notice period because a
victim of bad faith will take longer to obtain alternative work.61
It is important to note that while taking longer to find alternative work is a tangible result
of bad faith, the Court turned its back on Hadley, Addis/Peso, and to an extent, Vorvis,
by deciding that the intangible injuries flowing from termination, in and of themselves,
could also be compensable.62 Recall that past jurisprudence allowed recovery in a
wrongful dismissal action only for the failure to provide reasonable notice, or later on,
for an act that was already itself independently actionable. To justify this paradigm shift,
the Court analogized from libel law, where the act of defamation allows recovery for
intangible injuries to one’s state of mind.63 The Court reasoned this was appropriate
given the damage to Wallace’s professional reputation on account of his employer’s
egregious (and groundless) accusations. This analogy underlies the Court’s other
examples of wrongdoing that, occurring in the course of termination, could also be
compensable by Wallace damages. Examples include: humiliation, embarrassment, and
damage to self-worth or self-esteem.64
NO EVIDENCE, NO PROBLEM: ANALYZING WALLACE DAMAGES’ IMPACT ON EMPLOYER
CONDUCT
i.

Wrongful Dismissal Policy: Lessons Learned from Defamation Law

It is crucial to note that since defamation law provides the justification for recovering
intangible losses, Wallace damages, like libel, did not require the plaintiff to lead
evidence of intent or harm suffered. Defamation law justifies this on two grounds. The
57

Ibid at para 90.
Ibid at para 91.
59
Ibid at para 92.
60
Ibid at para 94.
61
Ibid at para 95.
62
Ibid at para 104.
63
Ibid at para 105.
64
Ibid at para 103.
58
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first is that, as a tort, damages in defamation are calculated on a compensatory, rather
than expectation, basis; the intention is to put the plaintiff back in the position had the
tortious act not occurred. However, due to the difficulty of exhaustively approximating
loss from harm to reputation, for policy reasons tort law recognizes the concept of
damages-at-large, which is designed to compensate for such intangible injury.65 As a
result, no evidence is required to establish proof of loss.
Note that in employment-related tort actions, damages-at-large for reputational injury
have awarded compensation for past and future income loss.66 The logic is that the
tortious act may have not only resulted in the loss of a job, but also in the loss of a
career.67 Further, in defamation cases, the plaintiff is not required to prove that the
defendant intended to undertake the tortious action. This is because Canadian and
English common law has long held that a finding of recklessness will constitute
“constructive malice”, satisfying a tort’s requirement for intent.68 In light of the Keays
reformulation which burdens the plaintiff with having to prove actual loss from the
alleged bad faith discharge, it is important to be mindful of the reasons why this was
originally not the case.
With respect to why plaintiffs ought not to bear a heavy evidentiary burden, the reasons
why the Supreme Court rejected the “actual malice” rule from US defamation law are
exemplary. As mentioned, Canadian and English common law does not require the
plaintiff to prove loss or intent in a defamation action. In Hill v Church of Scientology,69
the Church of Scientology urged the Supreme Court to adopt the US’s “actual malice”
rule. This rule eliminated the common law’s presumption of falsity and intent, instead
requiring the plaintiff to prove that, at the time made, the defendant knew the defamatory

65
McCarey v Associated Newspapers Ltd, [1965] 2 QB 86 (CA). Consider the following passage
from the speech of Lord Pearson:

“Compensatory damages, in a case in which they are at large, may include…not
only actual pecuniary loss and anticipated pecuniary loss or any social
disadvantages which result, or may be thought likely to result, from the wrong
which has been done. They may also include the natural injury to his feelings -- the
natural grief and distress which he may have felt at having been spoken of in defamatory
terms, and if there has been any kind of high-handed, oppressive, insulting or
contumelious behaviour by the defendant which increases the mental pain and
suffering caused by the defamation and may constitute injury to the plaintiff’s
pride and self-confidence, those are proper elements to be taken into account in a
case where the damages are at large.” [Emphasis added]
66

See eg, Drouillard v Cogeco Cable Inc, 2007 ONCA 322, 86 OR (3d) 431.
Ibid at para 42.
68
Fedele v Windsor Teachers Credit Union Ltd, 2001 CLLC 210-001 (Ont SCJ), aff’d 10 CCEL
(3d) 254 (Ont CA). See also Cogeco, supra note 68 paras 39-40, where the rule was applied in the
context of the tort of interference with contractual relations. Note that the application to
employment may have limits on the grounds of policy considerations: see Piresferreira v Ayotte,
2010 ONCA 384, 263 OAC 347 [“Piresferreira”] for a discussion of the tort of negligent
infliction of mental suffering.
69
[1995] 2 SCR 1130 [“Hill v Church of Scientology”].
67
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statements were false, or acted recklessly in not doing so.70 As such, the “actual malice”
rule resembles the Keays formulation of bad faith damages in a number of ways. Most
significantly, both encumber plaintiffs with an evidentiary burden; with “actual malice”
it is to prove falsity, and with Keays it is to prove harm.
In Hill, the Supreme Court rejected “actual malice” based on the US’s troubled
experience with the doctrine. For one, the emphasis on proving falsity in defamation
was said to result in overly detailed inquiries into matters of media procedure.71 This, in
turn, significantly increased the length of the trial and discoveries, which often
obfuscated the claim’s purpose and had the effect of coercing settlement.72
Consequently, the burden of proving “actual malice” was said to actually increase, rather
than decrease, the threat to freedom of expression.73 Similarly, the elongated inquiry
was said to dramatically increase the cost of litigation, leaving many resource-strapped
plaintiffs without access to justice.74 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in light of
these obstacles, many thought that the purpose of the “actual malice” rule had become
perverted by effectively protecting the dissemination of falsehoods, rather than thwarting
them.75 Scholars argue the totality of this has exacted a major cost on American
society.76 In concluding that the “actual malice” rule was not appropriate for Canadian
jurisprudence, the Court noted:77
[The law of defamation] is the means by which the individual may
protect his or her reputation which may well be the most distinguishing
feature of his or her character, personality and, perhaps, identity. I
simply cannot see that the [current] law of defamation is unduly
restrictive or inhibiting. Surely it is not requiring too much of
individuals that they ascertain the truth of the allegations they
publish. … Those who publish statements should assume a reasonable
level of responsibility. [Emphasis added]
With respect to the current defamation law’s presumption of falsity, the Court’s
comment about it not being a burden on publishers in light of the significance of one’s
reputation is telling. Consider the following statement from Wallace regarding the effect
a presumption of injury might have on employers:78
The law should be mindful of the acute vulnerability of terminated
employees and ensure their protection by encouraging proper conduct
and preventing all injurious losses which might flow from acts of bad
faith or unfair dealing on dismissal, both tangible and intangible. I
70
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note that there may be those who would say that this approach
imposes an onerous obligation on employers. I would respond simply
by saying that I fail to see how it can be onerous to treat people fairly,
reasonably, and decently at a time of trauma and despair. In my view,
the reasonable person would expect such treatment. So should the law.
[Emphasis added]
In both situations, the Supreme Court held that the interests of the individual, in terms of
equity and access to justice, were best served by burdening the more powerful entity
(employers and publishers) with presumptions and duties that would otherwise be unfair,
but-for the unequal relationship and resource disparity. In other words, the Court
recognized that defamation litigants might not be able to recover damages to their
reputation if they were saddled with onerous evidentiary requirements; as a result,
publishers are burdened with risks caused by the law’s presumption of falsity for
defamatory statements they publish. The assumption is that, in response, publishers will
undertake more diligent publishing practices. Similarly in Wallace, the Court realized
terminations conducted in bad faith could cause far more injury to employees than pay in
lieu of notice encompasses; consequently, the law imposes risks of employers having to
compensate for invisible injuries caused by their termination process. Again, the
assumption is that employers will address this risk with more dignified and polished
termination procedures.
ii.

The ERM-Reflexive Regulation Analysis: Connecting Wallace’s Uncertainty to
Termination Best Practices

So what happened in Wallace and Hill? Simply put, the Supreme Court exercised an
ingenious form of reflexive regulation. In both cases, the law imposed a significant
measure of uncertainty; in terms of the risk of defending litigation that assumes
published statements are false and damaging, and the risk of defending litigation that
assumes injury was caused by an egregious termination.
From an ERM perspective, there are tremendous risks associated with such level of
uncertainty. First, there are obvious financial risks in terms of having to pay additional
damages. Further, because company auditors assess risks posed by ongoing litigation
and their conclusions are a matter of public record, lawsuits for dismissals made in bad
faith could theoretically affect a company’s share price as well. A corporate reputation
tarnished by allegations of bad faith also poses many problems in terms of strategic risk.
Not only are court documents containing the allegations available to the public, but when
the plaintiff was a former colleague, employment litigation has a tendency to polarize the
workforce as well. Depending on the nature of the Wallace claim, the damage to a
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company’s reputation may also impair its ability to compete for top talent.79 Finally, in
certain competitive industries, this damage can reverberate further and potentially erode
price premiums that had previously been maintained by consumer loyalty.80
In light of the foregoing, while operational procedures are the greatest source of Wallace
liability, revising them also presents the greatest opportunity for risk mitigation and
value creation; this is where the practice of operational risk comes in. For example,
human resources personnel and lawyers are frequently the “lightning rod” for
employment disputes. As part of a risk assessment that draws on their workplace
expertise, these agents are uniquely positioned to enhance their roles in the eyes of
senior management by identifying termination-related risks in company policies and
procedures, which could be susceptible to Wallace damages’ ubiquitous uncertainty. In
response, management will operationalize new measures aimed at mitigating those
risks.81 While it is outside the scope of this paper to attempt a thorough human resources
analysis of the organizational value that can be derived from this, it would certainly be
an area ripe for further research. That said, the net result of tying the risk of uncertainty
posed by Wallace damages’ presumption of injury to the self-correcting theory of
reflexive regulation and ERM is that workplaces will function better as employers strive
to isolate and eliminate possible liability for bad faith discharges.
iii.

Arbitrary by Prolific: Precedents Set by Wallace Damages

In light of Wallace damages’ notorious uncertainty, ERM practitioners relied on case
law to identify what conduct, practices, or procedures left employers vulnerable to
allegations of bad faith. In the years following Wallace, one lawyer noted that “the
novel ways some employers exhibit their insensitivity to their dismissed workers,
combined with an imaginative and diligent plaintiff’s bar, provide[s] endless fact
scenarios.”82 In the ten years following this statement, plaintiffs’ lawyers have lived up
to that expectation. Without attempting to be exhaustive, courts have awarded Wallace
damages for the following employer conduct:
•

Making serious but unsubstantiated allegations of just cause;83

•

Making express or implicitly derogatory remarks about the plaintiff to his
or her former colleagues after dismissal;84
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•

Threatening to rescind a severance package and allege just cause if the
employer’s offer was not accepted;85

•

Terminating a dissenting employee that refused to accept changes to the
terms of employment in order to secure agreement from other employees;86

•

Refusing to provide a letter of reference;87

•

Failing to allow an employee to respond to allegations of wrongdoing prior
to termination;88

•

Withholding statutory severance/termination pay in order to coerce
settlement;89

•

Firing without first investigating the surrounding circumstances;90

•

Failing to inform a sick employee who resigned because of illness about
the availability of disability benefits;91

•

Preventing an employee from qualifying for disability benefits by making
unsubstantiated allegations of malingering to the insurance company;92

•

Firing employees returning to work from disability leave;93

•

Failing to cooperate in a timely manner with the discovery process;94

•

Engaging in abusive treatment that culminated in constructive dismissal
(regardless of intent to humiliate or embarrass);95

•

Firing a “whistle blowing” employee;96 and

•

Conducting a termination by telephone message.97

Although courts also frequently declined to award Wallace damages, the remedy quickly
gained a reputation for being notoriously arbitrary. In light of this, a cottage industry
dedicated to educating employers about termination practices and how to minimize
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liability quickly developed.98 This created a healthy eco-system of normative
employment standards in the following way: The ubiquity of Wallace “bumps” enticed
plaintiffs’ lawyers to risk carrying a wrongful dismissal action on contingency, resulting
in more theories of bad faith being tested by courts, which led to more reported decisions
on examples of bad faith that were fed back into the employment bar for dissemination
to employers, who incorporated them into revised operational procedures. The net result
was an “upwardly ratcheting” system of normative employment standards for nonunionized employees, functioning entirely under the purview of reflexive regulation.
As the saying goes, however, “all good things must come to an end”. While
management-side employment lawyers loudly bemoaned advising on, and litigating
against, Wallace damage claims,99 the judiciary soon began to sympathize with their
cause. Notably, the Honourable Justice Randall Scott Echlin of the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice, a prominent employment law jurist and former management-side
employment lawyer,100 lashed out at the plaintiff bar’s propensity to test novel theories
of bad faith in Yanez v Canac Kitchens.101 Echlin J. described the plaintiff’s lawyer as
“throw[ing] in the kitchen sink” in terms of ancillary claims, which resulted in “more
than half of the total trial time [being] dedicated to the plaintiff’s claim for ‘Wallace
damages’”. The conduct in question concerned the employer’s failure to offer the
statutory minimum level of notice for an employee with 16 years of service, and its
insistence that he sign a Release, characterizing the offer as “more than fair”. The
employer led evidence that this was a mere mistake that was quickly rectified, but the
plaintiff nonetheless pursued his claim for Wallace damages. Echlin J. allowed the
claim for wrongful dismissal, flatly denied a Wallace “bump”, and then fired a shot
across the bow of plaintiff lawyers everywhere across Canada by suggesting
unmeritorious Wallace claims might warrant sanctions involving reduced cost or damage
awards.102
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This lawsuit involved an employer who, while being less than generous, did attempt to
do it right…when it was notified that it had made a mistake, rather than to stonewall, it
immediately remedied the situation…
… The time has now come to express this Court’s disapproval of routine assertions
of “Wallace damage” claims which are not justified by the facts.
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Echlin J.’s concerns about Wallace claims not grounded in fact are reasonable; indeed, in
Wallace Iacobucci J. noted the remedy was not “anything akin to an automatic claim for
damages…in every case of dismissal.”103 However, Echlin J.’s contention that such
claims have no value and waste court time is not accurate; in addition to knowing what
makes them liable, employers also need to know what conduct will not attract Wallace
liability. For example, the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision that rejected Wallace
damages for firing an employee on sick leave provided important clarification on how to
conduct risky terminations with dignity and respect.104
Despite the benefits of Wallace that this paper has advocated, it is no longer the law in
Canada. The new law that governs terminations conducted in bad faith is Honda v
Keays. As will be explained, the focus is no longer on what the employer has (or has
not) done, but rather on the proof of injury the plaintiff must produce. This paper’s
position is that Keays’ approach removes the disciplining effect on employer conduct
that Wallace had, and in effect, destroys the eco-system of precedent and education that
reflexively created the normative system of ever-improving employment standards that
Canadian workplaces used to enjoy.
…IS NOW NEW AGAIN: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN HONDA V KEAYS
i.

Extreme Facts Lead to Extreme Law

Similar to Wallace, extreme facts lead to extreme law, and Honda v Keays had no
shortage of either. Kevin Keays was a dedicated, “conscientious”, but disabled,
employee of Honda Canada who was terminated for just cause after fourteen years of
service. Eleven years after he began working, Keays was diagnosed with chronic fatigue
syndrome and went on disability leave. He returned to work a year later after his insurer
determined he was fit to do so and was placed in Honda’s disability management
program. Even with light data entry work, Keays’ absences continued. While the
program permitted this to some extent, Honda became concerned once the medical notes

… Such claims seriously impede the potential consensual resolution of disputes which
could otherwise be settled well short of trial. Additionally, the assertion and defence of
specious “Wallace claims” can consume large amounts of valuable court time; can
increase the costs to all concerned; and can generally drive the parties apart.
[T]hought must be given in future cases to appropriate deterrents against plaintiffs
who assert “Wallace claims” which are clearly without merit and should not have
been advanced. Sanctions could include a diminution of either the costs award or
the amount awarded for such dismissal claims.
I make no reduction in the amount awarded to this plaintiff in this instance, nor do I
reduce the amount granted for costs. However, in future cases, clearly unmeritorious
claims for “Wallace damages”, having little or no foundation on the evidence, may well
face sanctions. [Emphasis added]
103
104
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he was required to obtain stopped being evaluative and instead became vague and selfreporting. The requirement to obtain notes for each absence led to a showdown, with
Honda asking Keays to submit to an examination by their in-house doctor and Keays
refusing to do so until he knew the exact purpose of the meeting. Exacerbating this was
Honda’s cancellation of Keays’ limited accommodation, allegedly as reprisal for Keays’
decision to retain counsel. Honda sent Keays a letter stating that if he did not meet with
their doctor, he would be fired. As no explanation was provided, Keays refused and was
fired for just cause. He then sued for wrongful dismissal.
The trial judge found that Honda’s conduct was egregious, reprehensible, and evidenced
a “conspiracy” against Keays, who was awarded fifteen months notice, an additional
nine months of Wallace damages, a costs premium fixed at $610,000, and a punitive
damages award of $500,000, the largest in Canadian employment law history. Honda
appealed, and at the Court of Appeal for Ontario was successful only in reducing the
punitive damages award and costs premium. The majority found the award “generous,
but fair”, with Goudge J.A. noting in dissent that the entire punitive damages award
ought to have remained intact in light of Honda’s misconduct. Honda appealed again,
this time to the Supreme Court of Canada.
Writing for the majority, Bastarache J. did not offer the expected guidance on how
employers should lawfully terminate disabled employees. Nor did he elaborate on how
employers should accommodate employees with invisible disabilities, such as chronic
fatigue syndrome, chronic pain, and fibromyalgia. Rather, he side-stepped these issues
completely and took the opportunity instead to reformulate how damages for bad faith
were to be awarded in wrongful dismissal actions. In doing so, the Court divested itself
entirely from Wallace and arguably reunified the contract of employment with its
commercial brethren under the principles of Hadley v Baxendale.
ii.

Back to Baxendale For The Damages Formerly Known as Wallace

In Keays, the Court spent a great amount of time retracing damages in wrongful
dismissal law before attempting to shoe-horn them all in under the auspice of Hadley v
Baxendale, a case that had nothing to do with employment law.
Rather than overturn Wallace, Vorvis, and other case law that espoused the Supreme
Court’s modern policy on non-unionized employment, Bastarache J. attempted to pay
homage to their principles by acknowledging that termination will always cause
employees to suffer some degree of emotional harm, and that an employer’s acts of bad
faith at this time can exacerbate this harm. In doing so, Bastarache J. invoked Hadley’s
stipulation that only that which was in the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the
time of contract formation could be compensable. Bastarache J. reasoned that when the
employment contract is formed, both the employer and employee would have
contemplated the debilitating impact of bad faith conduct at termination. Thus, in the
event an employer’s behaviour was particularly egregious and the employee can prove
that it caused more harm than what was contemplated to be “normal”, then Bastarache J.
held this difference could be compensable. In other words, the Supreme Court took the
values espoused by Wallace, made them foreseeable under the Hadley test, but as a
purely compensatory remedy, now requires strict proof of actual losses. In practice, this
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has the effect of barring recover for many of the intangible injuries Wallace stood to
protect against, such as embarrassment, humiliation, and loss of reputation. As stated by
Bastarache J.:105
“Damages attributable to conduct in the manner of dismissal are always
to be awarded under the Hadley principle. Moreover, in cases where
damages are awarded, no extension of the notice period is to be used to
determine the proper amount to be paid. The amount is to be fixed
according to the same principles and in the same way as in all other
cases dealing with moral damages. Thus, if the employee can prove
that the manner of dismissal caused mental distress that was in the
contemplation of the parties, those damages will be awarded not
through an arbitrary extension of the notice period, but through an
award that reflects the actual damages.” [emphasis added]
As a result of this, and in particular because Keays had not led evidence at trial of the
termination’s impact on him, Kevin Keays’ nine-month Wallace extension was
extinguished, as was his punitive damages award and cost premium, leaving him with
only his original fifteen-month notice period and Honda’s bill of legal fees. In dissent,
LeBel and Fish JJ. expressed concern that the Court was turning its back on the
progressive position it had taken with respect to non-unionized employees:106
“[A]ny revision [of wrongful dismissal damages] must reflect the view
accepted by this Court that the contract of employment is a good faith
contract that is informed by the values protected by and recognized in
the human rights codes and the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, particularly in respect of discrimination. As the Court
found in Wallace v. United Grain Growers Ltd., the contract of
employment often reflects substantial power imbalances. As a
result, it must be performed and terminated in good faith, and
fairly.
…
With respect, I believe that on the facts of this case, the award of
additional damages for manner of dismissal (formerly “Wallace
damages”) should stand. The trial judge committed no overriding
errors in this respect. Although his review of the facts may not have
been flawless, there was a sufficient basis for the findings of bad
faith and discrimination in the manner in which the employment of
the respondent, Kevin Keays, was terminated by Honda. [Emphasis
added]
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These statements suggest that plaintiffs need not to be held to such strict proof of actual
injury, and that a trial judge’s imputed findings of fact may instead suffice. For the
reasons that follow, this ought to be the preferred interpretation of Keays going forward.

ANALYZING KEAYS/HADLEY’S IMPACT ON EMPLOYER CONDUCT
i.

No Evidence, No Recovery: Bad Faith Damages Post-Keays

In the wake of Keays, practitioners and scholars debated the actual impact the case
would have.107 Some speculated that Keays was merely a superficial restatement of
existing law that simply changed the form the damage award took in terms of extended
notice vis-à-vis monetary lump sum.108 For example, shortly after Keays was released, a
dismissed employee in Simmons v. Webb109 was awarded $20,000 in “moral damages”
on account of his employer’s bad faith, despite the fact that the plaintiff led no evidence
with respect to actual damages caused by the employer’s conduct at termination.
Notwithstanding initial confusion, in the two years since Keays was released, appellate
courts across Canada have begun to strictly enforce plaintiffs’ evidentiary burden with
respect to proving loss caused by the manner of dismissal.110 For example, in Brien v
Niagara Motors,111 the Ontario Court of Appeal overturned a bad faith damage award on
account of conduct that had typically been a “lock” under Wallace: recklessly advancing
unfounded just cause allegations. In particular, the employer asserted it had just cause to
terminate an employee with 23 years of service for, among other things, refusing to work
weekends. The trial judge found that the employer was simply trying to avoid paying
out a lengthy notice period. The Court of Appeal did not disagree, even noting that the
employer’s misconduct could have sustained a damage award under Keays, however:112
“…the mental distress that the respondent suffered upon her termination
and the manner of that termination was not of the nature and scope to
qualify for compensatory damages in accordance with that decision, as
the respondent did not seek any medical attention, professional
assistance or undergo any therapy for her mental distress.”
[Emphasis added]
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With respect, the employee had to endure the cost and stress of taking her employer all
the way to trial in order to realize her lawful entitlement of 24 months notice. While
Wallace’s uncertainty and presumption of injury may have facilitated settlement from
the onset, Keays’ requirement that a plaintiff establish proof of intangible losses allows
an employer to be far, far more bullish, as shown in Brien, when litigating wrongful
dismissal claims.113
A case from Saskatchewan, Fox v Silver Sage Housing Corporation,114 similarly
illustrates the troubling turn wrongful dismissal law has taken. In Fox, the trial judge
made findings of fact against the employer on account of the following: that Fox was
terminated based on management’s intense personal dislike for him, that Fox was lied to
at the time of termination, that the employer orchestrated a “phony” corporate
reorganization simply to “get rid” of Fox, and that the employer engaged in “vindictive
and thoroughly unprofessional” behaviour by contacting the employer of Fox’s wife
after his termination. While the foregoing were previously clear indicia of bad faith, the
court held that Fox “[had] not proven that the stress and depression he suffered is related
to the manner in which he was treated.” As such, Fox received no damages for his
mistreatment.
If it is not enough, as in Fox, for a court to clearly accept that the employer acted
egregiously and that the employee suffered stress and depression as a result, what
deterrents are there to make sure that employers treat discharged employees with dignity
and respect? While there is a reported case where the plaintiff called an expert witnesses
to testify as to the impact the manner of termination had on her psyche,115 it is submitted
that by having to proceed all the way to trial to do so, Keays is not doing terminated
employees—previously recognized as a vulnerable group in society—any favours
whatsoever.
ii.

The Danger of Subsuming Tort into Contract: Piresferreira and Soost

While Keays has made it more difficult for employees to recover for intangible injuries,
more dangerous is the very recent pronouncement that all claims related to the manner of
termination, including freestanding causes of action in tort, must be subsumed into the
Keays/Hadley framework. Because damages in tort are calculated differently than in
contract—based on making the plaintiff “whole” versus performance of the contract—
this has the potential to reduce damage awards for tortious conduct by an order of
magnitude.
The Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in Piresferreira v Ayotte stands for this troubling
precedent. In Piresferreira, the plaintiff’s claims arose from an altercation with her
supervisor, which the court accepted was assault. The supervisor was subject to minor
discipline, and as reprisal, tried to place the plaintiff on a performance improvement
113
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plan. After being presented with the plan, the plaintiff went on sick leave and then longterm disability, which represented the end of her active employment with Bell. She then
sued her supervisor for a variety of torts and, with respect to Bell, constructive dismissal.
The trial judge found the supervisor personally liable for battery and intentional and
negligent infliction of mental suffering, while Bell was held vicariously liable for the
supervisor’s torts and directly liable for negligent infliction of mental suffering and
constructive dismissal. Due to tort’s measure of damages that allowed for past and
future income loss, the plaintiff received over $500,000 in compensation.
The Ontario Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge’s decision almost entirely. In
particular, it held that the tort of negligent infliction of mental suffering was not
available in workplace disputes because the Keays/Hadley framework was intended to
deal comprehensively with all mental distress claims arising from employer conduct
coinciding with termination of employment:116
In a case in which the employer’s allegedly tortious behaviour
includes the termination of the employee, compensation for mental
distress is available under the framework the Supreme Court has set
out in Honda. In a case in which the employer does not terminate
the employee, the employee who is caused mental distress by the
employer’s abusive conduct can claim constructive dismissal and
still have recourse to damages under the Honda framework.
Recognizing the tort in the employment relationship would overtake
and supplant that framework and all of the employment law
jurisprudence from which it evolved. In other words, in the dismissal
context, the law already provides a remedy in respect of the loss
complained of here. [emphasis added]
Notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff had been diagnosed with depression, anxiety,
and post-traumatic stress disorder, all caused by the supervisor’s assault, the Court of
Appeal rolled all her losses into the Keays/Hadley framework, which produced a mental
distress award of merely $45,000.
Piresferreira’s holding that tortious actions coinciding with the end of employment must
be subsumed into a Hadley/Keays claim sets a dangerous precedent that withholds the
tort measure of relief from those who need it the most. That is, it makes no sense to
permit actions in tort, or a tort scale of recovery, at other times during the relationship
but not at the end, when an employee is—or at least previously was thought to be—most
vulnerable. Further, subsuming tort into the Keays/Hadley framework also conflates
different heads of damages’ differing analytic purposes. First, Hadley, which underlies
Keays, is, and always has been, a limit on damages; it is not a ground for awarding
them.117 Further, remedies in contract are compensatory to the extent that they reflect
performance of the contract but-for the breach, which is why wrongful dismissal
compensates with reasonable notice. If an injury prevents a plaintiff from ever
116
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performing another contract, then tort is, and always has been, the appropriate realm for
recovery, even in employment law.118 Surely a mental distress award representing the
loss of Piresferreira’s working life ought to be worth more than $45,000?119
With respect to denying the tort of intentional infliction of mental suffering, the Court of
Appeal also divested itself from a long line of cases, if not a common law principle, that,
as discussed, intent can be imputed from a finding of recklessness. Indeed, McLachlin J.
(as she was then) espoused this principle in Rahemtulla v. Vanfred Credit Union120 when
she allowed recklessess in lieu of intent to sustain the tort of intentional infliction of
metal suffering in a workplace dispute involving allegations of theft.121 Rather than
address this principle head on in Piresferreira, the Court of Appeal simply distinguished
Rahemtulla and suggested that workplace disputes require a higher level of
“recklessness” to order to ever sustain an intentional tort. The reasons for this, as one
might suspect, flow from Keays:122
"Recklessness" is a flexible term capable of different meanings in
different contexts. … The test stated in Prinzo and reaffirmed in
Correia maintains the distinction between intentional torts and
negligence. As noted Weiler J.A. said in Prinzo that the "consequences
must be known by the actor to be substantially certain to follow"
(emphasis added [in original]).
…
I have already rejected the recognition of the tort of negligent infliction
of mental suffering in an employment relationship. Accepting an
objective sense of "recklessness" dependent on whether the harm
ultimately suffered was foreseeable or likely to result should be
118

See eg, Sulz v Attorney General et al, 2006 BCSC 99, 263 DLR (4th) 58 involving recovery of
$950,000 for intentional infliction of mental suffering.
119
The award of $87,855 for pay in lieu of notice is excluded as it serves a different analytic
purpose.
120
(1984), 51 BCLR 200 (SC).
121
Ibid at paras 54-55. Consider the following reasoning by McLachlin J.:
Allegations of theft should not be made recklessly, without proper care for whether they
are true or not.
…
A further requirement of the tort of willful infliction of mental distress is that the
defendant's conduct be "plainly calculated to produce some effect of the kind which was
produced". In the case at Bar this element is established. It was clearly foreseeable
that the accusations of theft which the defendant made against the plaintiff would
cause her profound distress. That distress could only be exacerbated by the
defendant's failure to conduct a proper investigation or allow the plaintiff to defend
herself. It was equally foreseeable that the accusations would continue to cause
distress into the future, when, in seeking employment, she would be queried by
prospective employers as to the reasons for her dismissal from the defendant's
employ. [Emphasis added]
122

Piresferreira at para 76.
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rejected for the same reasons. Essentially, permitting liability on
such a reduced standard would unduly interfere with the settled
principles of employment law. [Emphasis added]
It is submitted that “settled principles of employment law” is more accurately read as,
“new era of employment law under Keays”. In this way, the Court of Appeal’s apparent
hesitation to permit tort recovery to overlap or, more likely in their minds supplant, the
Keays/Hadley framework is a very troubling proposition. As discussed, these torts exist
for a reason, and it is artificial and prejudicial to deny employees, but perhaps not other
individuals, access to tort’s measure of relief simply on account of the presence of an
employment relationship. Such a policy invokes memories of past injustices rendered
under the doctrine of common employment.123
Similar to Piresferreira, the Alberta Court of Appeal recently held that pure economic
loss—a tortious head of damage—caused by an alleged bad faith dismissal was not
compensable under the Keays/Hadley framework.124 The plaintiff was an investment
banker who was terminated without notice for a variety of reasons. While the trial judge
agreed with many of these reasons, he held that none were sufficient to sustain a finding
of just cause. Although the plaintiff found new employment within three weeks, many
of his former clients did not follow him. In light of this and the damage caused to the
plaintiff’s reputation, the trial judge awarded $1.6 million in Keays damages for the
economic loss resulting from the lost clients. The Alberta Court of Appeal quashed the
award, noting that the allegations of cause, notwithstanding actual harm suffered, did not
constitute bad faith:125
What if courts imposed heavy and almost automatic penalties on
any defendant who alleged cause in good faith, but then failed to
convince a judge or jury that it was bad enough? That would be
most unfair to employers. It would deter alleging cause, so that
employers with cause would instead have to give pay in lieu of notice (to
avoid a second set of damages). This would be the slacker’s charter. It
would significantly increase the expenses of hiring staff, and hence
increase prices charged to innocent customers. I wish to stress that
policy consideration. [Emphasis added]
With respect to the Alberta Court of Appeal, just cause is the “capital punishment of
employment law”;126 it is a high standard, and as such, there ought to be risks associated
with invoking it. Further, the court is obfuscating the issue; in this case, just cause was
likely pursued because, in light of the plaintiff’s extremely high salary, it was cheaper to
123

See eg, Priestly v Fowler (1837), 1 M&W 1 (Ex Ch) and Michael A. Stein, “Priestly v. Fowler
and the Emerging Tort of Negligence” 44 BC L Rev 689, concerning the prejudicial policy
considerations underlying the now-defunct doctrine of common employment, which precluded
recovery in tort for workplace injuries precisely because of the presence of an employment
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litigate than to settle. Previously such exploitation of the employee’s position at
termination would have engendered a finding of bad faith,127 but under Keays it was not
made out. Note, however, that even if it had been, the Alberta Court of Appeal was clear
that economic loss flowing from dismissal is not compensable under the Keays/Hadley
framework.128
Based on the foregoing, it should be clear that, as a result of Keays, courts are now more
hesitant than ever to allow full-fledged tort claims to coincide with actions for wrongful
dismissal. If aggrieved plaintiffs must now pick and chose a mutually exclusive cause of
action, then isn’t it fair to say that Canadian employment law has simply come full circle
and is now back to where it started over a hundred years ago under Addis/Peso’s strict
limits on wrongful dismissal recovery?
iii.

The Reflexive Regulation-Erm Analysis: Reduced Termination Risks Bolster
Operational Flexibility, But at What Cost?

From an ERM perspective, the limits placed on recovery under the Keays/Hadley
framework have significantly reduced the risks associated with termination. Whereas
Wallace’s presumption of injury focused the inquiry on the conduct of the employer,
Keays’ evidence-based formula shifts the focus to what loss the employee actually
suffered. In many respects, this takes the risk out of termination.
While a number of the financial risks from Wallace remain, others have been
substantially reduced. In particular, shareholders no longer have to worry about
$950,000 damage awards under the tort measure of recovery;129 rather, having been
collapsed into the Keays/Hadley rubric, bad faith damage awards, like other awards for
mental distress, will be consistently modest.130 Similarly, since Keays damages are paid
out in a lump sum, rather than as an extension to the notice period, an employer’s
financial liability will be more predictable. That is, not only will awards fall in line
between the usual $20,000 - $75,000, irrespective of whether the employee is at the
highest or lowest level of the company, but there will also be no uncertainty about the
length of the notice period extension. Under Wallace, the variance between a three to
six month extension (or more) had dramatically different financial implications
depending on the employee’s level of remuneration.
The operational risks associated with bad faith terminations under Keays have also
received a major adjustment. Most significantly, employers’ operational procedures are
now subject to far less scrutiny, which permits much more flexibility with respect to
termination. For example, while it was previously considered bad faith to fire someone
without a face-to-face meeting,131 employees must now lead evidence that this caused
127

See eg, Wallace note 3.
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them injury. Given the difficulty of recovering for far more egregious conduct,132
engendering liability for this seems quite improbable. As a result, employers might, for
example, now explore methods of mass terminations via electronic means. A further
benefit of Keays is that it eliminates the risk of aggressively litigating wrongful dismissal
claims. Employers previously faced sanctions for playing litigation “hardball”, in light
of the parties’ drastic resource imbalance, but that is no longer the case. Consequently,
operational resources previously dedicated to preventative measures can now be cut or
shifted to funding litigation. Think of it this way: is it still necessary to pay for training
on best termination practices if the liability now flows from the plaintiff’s actual injury
and not the termination conduct itself?
Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of Keays is the impact it will have on the
reflexively regulated normative system of “upwardly ratcheting” employment standards.
If Wallace created a healthy eco-system for ever-improving workplace norms, then it has
been thoroughly deforested by Keays. Consider this: Given the prospect of suing
employers that are willing, and now able, to play “hardball” under a framework that
discourages awarding additional damages, plaintiffs’ lawyers will be disincentivized
from bearing the risk of litigating on contingency. As a result, less wrongful dismissal
cases will be heard by the courts, leading to fewer reported decisions, which already
have diminished relevance in light of the focus on plaintiff injury and not employer
conduct. Consequently, training on best practices will be deemphasized, meaning that
operating procedures will stagnate, or worse, erode. In other words, rather than having
an incentive under Wallace to constantly improve, the net result under Keays will be a
“ratcheting down” of normative employment standards.
Recall that reflexive regulation operates by influencing actors’ normative practices so
that a preferred course of conduct is prioritized in light of the risks associated with
discouraged conduct; by taking the risk out of termination, the Supreme Court has
stripped away an important layer of reflexive regulation that protected employees and
improved norms for all workplaces across Canada. Some have suggested the net effect
of Keays will make employers more competitive in the face of international
competition,133 but time will tell whether this was, in fact, the right trade-off to make.

CONCLUSION: REVIVING THE TORT OF BAD FAITH DISCHARGE
This paper has argued the critical importance of injecting risk into employers’ decisionmaking process. If the Keays/Hadley framework is going to stand, then thought must be
given to reviving the tort of bad faith discharge that was urged on the Supreme Court
132
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See Ryan Henry Edmonds, “All Hands to Starboard! Situating Wrongful Dismissal’s Recent
Course Correction into Broader Labour Market Policy” (2010) [unpublished, submitted in
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School] online: http://papers.ssrn/com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1737944, for a discussion of
the interplay between the judiciary’s role in using legal doctrine to set quantum of termination
costs and broader labour market policy.
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during the hearing in Wallace.134 Not only should the tort measure of recovery be
available to employees in the most egregious of circumstances, but in order to positively
influence normative employment standards, employers also need to know that their
workplace practices are under judicial scrutiny. As it stands, for this the Keays/Hadley
framework is insufficient. Although a tort of bad faith discharge would undoubtedly
face judicial resistance for overlapping in purpose with Keays/Hadley, following a
thorough understanding of this paper, and for the sake of protecting the standards of
dignity and decency still enjoyed by workplaces across Canada, it is hoped the reader
will realize such a remedy is nonetheless necessary.
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See Wallace at paras 75-78 and Ball, “Bad Faith Discharge”.

